Transgenerational Tort Liability for Epigenetic Disease by Wiener, Christopher J.
DePaul Journal of Health Care Law 
Volume 13 
Issue 3 Summer 2011 Article 2 
October 2015 
Transgenerational Tort Liability for Epigenetic Disease 
Christopher J. Wiener 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jhcl 
Recommended Citation 
Christopher J. Wiener, Transgenerational Tort Liability for Epigenetic Disease, 13 DePaul J. Health Care L. 
319 (2011) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jhcl/vol13/iss3/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Journal of Health Care Law by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more 
information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
TRANSGENERATIONAL TORT LIABILITY FOR
EPIGENETIC DISEASE
By: Christopher J. Wiener*
INTRODUCTION
First year law students across the country learn about the dangers of
falling barrels' and the legal theory of res ipsa loquitur. Tort law,
developed over centuries in the Anglo-American common law, apportions
liability and damages for harms to persons and property. When these
harms are brought about by gravity-induced plunges or untimely
explosions the law can handle its apportionment role relatively easily;
however, twenty-first-century advances in our scientific understanding of
the causes of disease and injury are pushing tort law away from the lessons
of past experience. How do courts adjudicate liability and apportion
damages for harms that come about from damage to the microscopic
foundations of life that manifest themselves many years after the tortious
act and can affect individuals across generations? Should children of
smokers be able to sue their parents for the child's cancer, even if the
parent stopped smoking prior to conception? Could a grandchild sue a
grandparent or great-grandparent for an increased risk of disease brought
about by that ancestor's life choices?
This Article explores the mounting scientific evidence concerning the
impact of damage to the epigenome and how this damage can be heritable
across multiple generations. While myriad articles and cases have
discussed the ramifications of manufacturer liability for genetic and
epigenetic disease, the issue of parental liability has apparently gone
unexplored. The Article will proceed in four parts. Part I explains the
epigenome in general, the harms that damage to the epigenome can cause,
and issues surrounding how scientists are beginning to unravel the
heritability of that damage. Part 1I surveys existing case and statutory law
* J.D., summa cum laude, University of California, Hastings College of Law, 2011; B.A., Boston
University, 2008. 1 would like to thank Professor Jamie King for her invaluable assistance in writing this
Article.
1. See generally Byrne v. Boadle, (1963) 159 Eng. Rep. 299.
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concerning tort remedies for transgenerational harms, focusing especially
on the DES cases. This Part will also explore existing state laws regarding
maternal negligence (such as drug use) that causes harm to a child in
utero. Part III identifies the unique problems associated with epigenetic
tort liability across one or more generations, and how existing tort law
both is and is not able to handle this emerging scientific understanding.
Part IV proposes a liability framework for epigenetic disease and harm that
allows for parental liability while examining the legal and economic
justifications for such a system. Finally, Part V concludes the Article.
PART I: EXPLORING EPIGENETICS AND EPIGENETIC
DISEASE
Many are familiar with the basic building blocks of genetics:
deoxyribonucleic acid, better known as DNA. While DNA remains the
fundamental code of life, advances in our understanding of genetics and
genetic disease have led scientists to conclude that DNA alone fails to
account for all of the information present within our genes. Another
system, known as the epigenome, plays a crucial role in the regulation of
genetic activity and phenotypic expression. "The term 'epigenetics'
defines all meiotically and mitotically heritable changes in gene expression
that are not coded in the DNA sequence itself. Three systems, including
DNA methylation, RNA-associated silencing and histone modification, are
used to initiate and sustain epigenetic silencing."2 This 'meta-genome' can
have a marked impact on an organism's health and susceptibility to
disease, and many of these mutations in humans "can be inherited or
somatically acquired."'
What makes epigenetic disease and inheritance different from
genetics is the method by which mutations or changes occur. In DNA,
genes are inherited by the child from their parents; changes to the genetic
code come about from the mixing of parental DNA. 4 Epigenetic mutation
is different.' "DNA methylation patterns fluctuate in response to changes
in diet, inherited genetic polymorphisms and exposures to environmental
2. Gerda Egger, et al., Epigenetics in Human Disease and Prospects for Epigenetic Therapy, 429 NATURE
457, 457 (2004).
3. Id. at 458.
4. See generally CHARLOTTE K. OMOTO & PAUL F. LURQUIN, GENES AND DNA: A BEGINNER'S GUIDE TO
GENETICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS 19, 22-27 (2004).
5. See generally Eva Jablonka, Epigenetic Inheritance in Evolution, II J. OF EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY
159, 162 (1998).
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chemicals."6 These changes to the epigenome may not be restricted to just
the individual exposed to the environmental influence. In some animal
studies, exposure to certain chemicals resulted in changes to the
phenotypic expression of that animal's offspring, likely indicating
"transgenerational phenotypic effects" caused by epigenetic changes.'
Known epigenetic modifiers include metals such as cadmium, arsenic,
nickel, and chromium; particulates in air pollution; endocrine disruptors
like DES', Bisphenol-A, and dioxin; and other chemicals like benzene and
trichloroethylene.9 Other environmental factors have also been implicated
in epigenetic inheritance, including maternal exposure to malnutrition or
famine prior to the child's conception.o "If environmentally induced
heritable epigenetic changes are common and influence disease risk, they
would result in transient changes in both average risk and recurrence
risk."" Notably, assisted reproductive technologies ("ART") such as in
vitro fertilization may be causing epigenetic damage to embryos:
Recent evidence suggests that the manipulation of embryos for
the purposes of assisted reproduction or cloning may impose
inherent risks to normal development. . . . [A]n apparent
association with ARTs was recently found in registries of
children with Angelman syndrome and Beckwith-Wiedemann
syndrome. . . . Molecular analyses of patients with Angelman
syndrome and Beckwith-Wiedemann syndrome conceived by in
vitro fertilization or intracytoplasmic sperm injection revealed a
loss of maternal-specific DNA methylation at imprinting
centres, which indicates that the errors were epigenetic in
nature. Although individually rare, as a group, epigenetic errors
may impose significant risk for people conceived by ART....
Such reports suggest that technologies involving the
manipulation of cultured embryos may be the 'tip of the
iceberg' for a wider spectrum of epigenetic alterations."
Epigenetic damage could be the cause of many previously
6. David Rodenhiser & Mellissa Mann, Epigenetics and Human Disease: Translating Basic Biology into
Clinical Applications, 174 CMAJ. 341, 342-43 (2006).
7. Andrea Baccarelli & Valentina Bollati, Epigenetics and Environmental Chemicals, 21 CURRENT
OPINION IN PEDIATRICS 243, 249 (2009).
8. See Part IIA, infra.
9. See Baccarelli, supra note 7, at 244-49.
10. Montgomery Slatkin, Epigenetic inheritance and the missing heritability problem, 182 GENETICS 845,
848 (2009).
11. Id
12. Rodenhiser, supra note 6, at 344.
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unexplained negative outcomes from ART procedures or could result in
longer-term complications for ART children (and perhaps the children of
these children) due to epigenetic complications."
This is not to say that all epigenetic silencing or modifications are
necessarily heritable. Many modifications are wiped out during
conception when the epigenome is essentially 'reprogrammed' to a fresh
epigenetic slate. 4 Moreover, isolating epigenetic risk from larger
environmental and genetic factors is incredibly difficult." While the body
of knowledge indicating human epigenetic heredity is not extensive, more
controlled studies in animals have demonstrated the validity of the
underlying theory. 6
What science has shown is that epigenetics and epigenetic heredity is
a plausible answer for several disorders and diseases. The effects of
epigenetic modification can run the gamut from nonexistent to deadly.
Diseases causing intellectual disability, such as ATR-X syndrome, Fragile
X syndrome, Angelman's syndrome, Prader-Willli syndrome, Rett
syndrome, Rubinstein-Taybi syndrome and Coffin-Lowry syndrome have
been associated with an epigenetic cause." Likewise, ICF syndrome
(chromosomal instability and immunodeficiency), Beckwith-Wiedemann
Syndrome (overgrowth of organs), and leukemia have been shown to have
epigenetic bases." "Epigenetic changes can also have a major role in the
development of human cancer. For example, a high percentage of patients
with sporadic colorectal cancers with a microsatellite instability phenotype
show . . ." epigenetic silencing, indicating that this epigenetic change "can
result directly in genetic instability." 9 Exposure to environmental
influences, then, can have lasting impacts beyond the individual who was
exposed. Scientists are beginning to reveal the potential for
transgenerational harms. Take cancer, for example. In some cases,
epigenetic silencing (which scientists believe is a contributing factor to the
development of cancer) is found both within the cancerous tumor and in
"normal somatic tissue, including spermatozoa. These germline
13. See, e.g., Eamonn R. Maher, et al., Epigenetic risks related to assisted reproductive technologies:
Epigenetics, imprinting, ARTand icebergs, 18 HUMAN REPROD. 2508 (2003).
14. Daniel K. Morgan & Emma Whitelaw, The case for transgenerational epigenetic inheritance in
humans, 19 MAMMALIAN GENOME 394, 395 (2008).
15. See id at 396.
16. Id.
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'epimutations' predispose individuals carrying aberrant methylation
patterns to multiple cancers."20 Very recent evidence suggests that
affirmative acts of an individual, such as smoking, can lead to epigenetic
damage. Researchers in one study found that, in their study group, young
women who took up smoking during the study showed increased
methylation (epigenetic modification) compared to their non-smoking
counterparts.2 1
The field of epigenetics is undergoing rapid change and development
with new insights coming at a regular pace. A definitive, acquired and
heritable epigenetic disease has not been discovered in humans. But
damage to the epigenome from environmental influences (such as
smoking) has been shown, as has the ability to pass epigenetic information
transgenerationally.
PART II: TRANSGENERATIONAL HARMS: DES AND
MATERNAL ABUSE
There are two areas of existing law that have dealt with what could
be called transgenerational harms: products liability, specifically in the
DES cases; and maternal drug or alcohol abuse resulting in harm to the
fetus. Each provides informative guidance for the policy and practical
limitations of transgenerational liability.
A. The DES Cases
In 1980, the California Supreme Court issued its landmark ruling of
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, in which the court held the manufacturers
of Diethylstilbestrol (better known as DES) liable in proportion to their
share of the market at the time of the injury.2 2 DES was a widely
prescribed synthetic estrogen that was intended to reduce the risk of
miscarriage in pregnant women.23 The drug was used for a period of
roughly thirty years before the Food and Drug Administration banned its
use in 1971.24 As it turns out, exposure to DES in utero resulted in a
greatly increased risk of certain cancers amongst the daughters of women
20. See Egger, supra note 2, at 459.
21. See Y.T. Ma, et al., Smoking-induced P16 Methylation in Young Women, abstract available at
http://annonc.oxfordjoumals.org/content/21/suppl_8/viii63.full.pdf; see also Cancer-linked Epigenetic
Effects of Smoking Found, SCIENCE DAILY, Oct. 11, 2010, available at
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/10/101009082825.htm.
22. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 936-37 (Cal. 1980).
23. See id at 925.
24. Id.
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taking the drug.2 5 Mothers were unable to causally connect the drug they
took to a specific manufacturer, and were thus "unable to establish
traditional tort liability." 26  The court concluded that "as between an
innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter should bear the cost
of the injury."2 The court reasoned that manufacturers "are better able to
bear the cost of injury resulting from the manufacture of a defective
product. . . . [and are] in the best position to discover and guard against
defects in its products and to warn of harmful effects."28
Many courts would go on to accept the market share theory for DES
cases; 29 however, it should be noted that the California Supreme Court was
grappling with a periconception tort (as the harm came about from the
child's exposure in utero) rather than a preconception tort. More recently,
courts have begun dealing with so-called third generation DES cases (the
grandsons and granddaughters of the women who took DES). The two
most prominent appellate decisions grappling with this third generation of
cases have both denied relief to the plaintiffs.
In Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., the Court of Appeals of New York held
that DES cases were not uniquely different from general actions in tort and
refused "to recognize a cause of action not available in other contexts
simply (or at least largely)" because the case involved a DES injury."
Citing its decision in Albala (which will be discussed, infra), the court
argued that the recognition of multi-generational causes of action could
have "staggering implications" and held that it was the court's "duty to
confine liability within manageable limits. Limiting liability to those who
ingested the drug or were exposed to it in utero serves this purpose."'
Similarly, in Grover v. Eli Lilly & Co., the Ohio Supreme Court
rejected the plaintiffs cause of action, holding that "[k]nowledge of a risk
to one class of plaintiffs does not necessarily extend an actor's liability to
every potential plaintiff."32 While the court conceded that the
manufacturer owed a duty to the individual taking a drug and to that
individual's fetus, that duty does not extend to "her daughter's infant who
25. Id.
26. Donald G. Gifford & Paolo Pasicolan, Market Share Liability Beyond DES Cases: The Solution to the
Causation Dilemma in Lead Paint Litigation?, 58 S.C. L. REV. 115, 121 (2006).
27. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W. 37, 53-54 (Wis. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
30. Enright v. Eli Lilly& Co., 570 N.E.2d 198, 201 (N.Y. 1991).
31. Id. at 203 (internal citations omitted).
32. Grover v. Eli Lilly & Co., 591 N.E.2d 696, 700 (OH 1992).
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will be conceived twenty-eight years later," as the injury is ultimately too
remote in "time and causation."" These DES grandchildren have thus
faced high barriers of entry to the legal system, with courts essentially
drawing a line between second- and third-generational damages.
B. Maternal Drug Abuse
From approximately 1977 onward, some states have prosecuted
mothers for harm done to their children in utero due to drug and alcohol
abuse. "Since 1996, women in Hawaii, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah,
and Wisconsin have been charged with murder, attempted murder, or
manslaughter based on their use of drugs while pregnant or other behavior
alleged to have caused stillbirth, death, or other fetal harm."34 Most of
these prosecutions, however, have been unsuccessful." While criminal
liability has been difficult to enforce, many more states have amended
their civil child welfare laws to address maternal drug and alcohol abuse.
Six state courts have considered whether a child can sue a mother in
tort for prenatal harms suffered because of the mother's drug abuse while
pregnant, with three courts endorsing liability and three courts precluding
it." Michigan, New Hampshire, and Florida have allowed children to
maintain these suits in order to provide compensation for their injuries,
holding that the child's right to recovery outweighed the competing
interests of maternal privacy or the intra-family relationship." The Florida
appellate court framed the issue syllogistically:
Since a child born alive may maintain a cause of action against a
third party for injuries sustained in utero, and a child may sue
her mother in tort for negligence, it follows that a child born
alive may maintain a cause of action against her mother based
upon the negligence of the mother that caused the injury to the
child before her birth and that such recovery is available up to
the limits of liability insurance coverage. It is the Court's ruling
that a child should not be denied compensation for such injury
33. Id.
34. Linda C. Fentiman, In the Name of Fetal Protection: Why American Prosecutors Pursue Pregnant
Drug Users (and Other Countries Don't), 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 647, 649 (2009).
35. Id.
36. Lynn M. Paltrow, Pregnancy, Domestic Violence, and the Law, 8 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 461,
464-65 (2005).
37. See Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Symposium, Creating Children with Disabilities: Parental Tort Liability
for Preimplantation Genetic Interventions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 299, 322 (2008).
38. See Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981); Bonte v. Bonte, 616 A.2d 464 (N.H.
1992); Nat'l Cas. Co. v. N. Trust Bank of Fla., N.A., 807 So. 2d 86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
325
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW [VOL. 13:3:319
merely because of the identity of the tortfeasor."
The court cautioned, however, that its holding was informed by the
fact that the case involved a case of simple automobile negligence and that
the defendant-mother was insured.4 0 Illinois, Texas and Massachusetts, in
contrast, have denied recovery citing the notable problem of determining
the duty of care owed by the mother.4 This split among courts reflects the
uneasiness of the judiciary in imposing liability for prenatal torts-or, for
that matter, imposing criminal punishment-because of the difficulty in
fitting the parent-child relationship into our understanding of the duty of
care. Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable-and courts have ruled as
such-to impose this type of civil liability despite the concerns over
parental tort immunity or the constraint of maternal action; indeed, courts
have trended toward recognizing that "children are almost universally
permitted to sue their parent for prenatal injuries. When a fetus is harmed
in utero due to the mother's wrongdoing, the born child can sue the mother
for those injuries."42
PART III: EPIGENETICS AND PRECONCEPTION LIABILITY
"Few issues in tort law are more in need of clarification than those
encompassed by the concepts of legal cause and duty," notes Professor
Richard Wright.4 3 This is no less true when attempting to fit the square
peg of our modern understanding of the epigenetic causes of disease into
the round hole of common law tort, all while balancing the unique
problems of the tortious act occurring prior to conception.
A. Courts Grapple with Preconception Torts
Over the past few decades, courts have had to deal with a growing
number of cases involving preconception torts, where the negligent act
occurred prior to the plaintiffs conception yet was claimed to be the cause
of plaintiffs injury. Two cases are representative of the divide between
39. Nat'I Cas. Co., 807 So. 2d at 87.
40. Id.; see also infra Part IV (discussing insurability).
41. See Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355 (111. 1988); Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. App.
1999); Remy v. MacDonald, 801 N.E. 2d 260 (Mass. 2004).
42. Sandra L. Haley, Comment, The Parental Tort Immunity Doctrine: Is it a Defensible Defense?, 30 U.
RICH. L. REV. 575, 587 (1996).
43. Richard W. Wright, Once More into the Bramble Bush: Duty, Causal Contribution, and the Extent of
Legal Responsibility, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1071, 1072 (2001).
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the courts endorsing preconception torts and those that are skeptical of the
cause of action. One of the first cases to test the viability of preconception
torts was Jorgenson v. Meade Labs.44 In that case, the plaintiff alleged that
the defendant's birth control pills altered her chromosomal structure
ultimately resulting in the birth of twins with Down Syndrome.4 5 The
court approved of the plaintiffs theory, reasoning that preconception torts
are not so different from other torts to warrant blanket disapproval.46 The
court reasoned, hypothetically, that if "the view prevailed that tortious
conduct occurring prior to conception is not actionable in [sic] behalf of an
infant ultimately injured by the wrong, then an infant suffering personal
injury from a defective food product, manufactured before his conception,
would be without remedy."47 In contrast, the New York Court of Appeals
rejected preconception liability in Albala v. City ofNew York."5 In Albala,
the plaintiff-mother suffered a perforated uterus during an abortion that
preceded the birth of the child at issue in the case.49 Plaintiff alleged that
the damage to her uterus ultimately resulted in brain damage to her later-
conceived child."o The court concluded that the "recognition of a cause of
action under these circumstances would require the extension of traditional
tort concepts beyond manageable bounds . . . ."" The Albala court and
others that have followed its policy-based reasoning seem to fear that:
if courts were to allow the first generation of plaintiffs to
recover, they would also be required to allow later generations
to recover. Subjecting a tortfeasor to these claims by multiple
generations would impose a burden disproportionate to the risk
created. To avoid such a result, and to keep from drawing
unprincipled distinctions between first generation and later
generation plaintiffs, it is better to deny recovery to all
preconception injury plaintiffs.52
Professor Greenberg, among other commentators, disagrees with the
rationale put forward by these courts, arguing that they are focusing too
44. Jorgenson v. Meade Johnson Labs., Inc., 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973).
45. Id. at 238-39.
46. See id at 240.
47. Id.
48. Albany v. City of N.Y., 429 N.E.2d 786 (N.Y. 1981).
49. Id. at 787.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Julie A. Greenberg, Reconceptualizing Preconception Torts, 64 TENN. L. REv. 315, 345 (1997).
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much on the timing of the negligent act vis-d-vis the timing of the
plaintiffs conception, as well as the hypothetical risk of multigenerational
liability."
The Illinois Supreme Court in Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital noted
the problem of multigenerational liability but felt that it could be addressed
through (unnamed) judicially enforced boundaries.54 The court reasoned
that a duty exists to those who are foreseeably harmed, even if they are
"unknown and remote in time and place." The court further reasoned that
it would be illogical to allow recovery when the defendant harmed a
person who was conceived prior to the tortious act, though the defendant
was unaware, but bar recovery for a person who was not yet conceived
even though the defendant's actions were the same." It is notable that in
all of these cases the defendant was either a medical doctor negligent in
the care of the mother or a drug manufacturer who created a drug taken by
the mother-in no case were the parents themselves held liable for
preconception torts.56
B. Preconception Tort Liability and Epigenetics
Three elements of a negligence claim are particularly problematic
when confronting a claim for transgenerational epigenetic harm; however,
"[s]imply banning preconception genetic torts by declaring that they are
not viable claims is ill-advised."" Instead, it is necessary to look to the
actual elements of negligence that are problematic and identify how those
problems could be rectified. First, what duty of care is owed by the
mother to the child or grandchild? Second, how can the child show that
the parent's negligence proximately caused their injury? And third, what
injuries do we recognize as legally cognizable?
1. Duty of Care to the Unborn and Their Progeny
Perhaps the most problematic element of a preconception genetic tort
53. See id. at 351, 355-56.
54. Renslow, 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (Ill. 1977).
55. Id.
56. See, e.g, Empire Cas. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 764 P.2d 1191 (Colo. 1988),
57. Daniel S. Goldberg, Against Genetic Exceptionalism: An Argument In Favor Of The Viability Of
Preconception Genetic Torts, 10 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 259, 280 (2007) (continuing "As nearly all
courts specifically addressing the problem have noted explicitly or implicitly, preconception genetic torts
pose novel and challenging issues. However, setting precedent denying the cause of action in and of itself is
a knee-jerk response to a problem that is unlikely to vanish altogether. Moreover, upon examination of
court's cited fears regarding injury and causation in a preconception genetic tort paradigm, the knee-jerk
response is not justified").
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claim is the duty of the tortfeasor to the unconceived, unborn child. Judge
Cardozo cautions jurists that "[p]roof of negligence in the air, so to speak,
will not do."" The Renslow dissent pointed to the lack of foreseeability
inherent in multigenerational torts as necessarily invoking mere
"negligence in the air."" Indeed, Justice Ryan's dissent argues that
multigenerational liability would preclude insurability due to the
potentially endless stream of liability flowing from a single tortious act,
and that the consequences of abrogating foreseeability are, themselves,
unforeseeable."o The Albala court similarly based its rejection of
preconception torts on the lack of duty. The court recognized that it was
foreseeable that the injury plaintiff suffered prior to conception could harm
a later-conceived fetus, but felt that this "foreseeability alone" was
insufficient to establish duty.61 Citing the good public policy of
manageable judicial standards, the court reasoned essentially that because
duty to the unconceived could have negative implications, no duty should
be recognized at all.62
These cases dealt with third-party liability for preconception harms.
Professor Kirsten Smolensky has concluded that while third parties may
owe a duty of care to a fetus preconception or during gestation, courts
have been reluctant to expand that liability to a mother, it may violate her
bodily integrity." In her survey of the limited jurisprudence on parental
liability, Smolensky notes that courts have been unwilling to subject
mothers to a prenatal duty of care, citing concerns over the expansion of
tort law, maternal freedom of action while pregnant, and the interactions
between prenatal liability and abortion rights." Parental liability for pre-
implementation genetic diagnosis, in Smolensky's opinion, does not
implicate maternal freedom of action as the decisions are made outside the
mother's body and could not therefore interfere with that mother's
freedoms." "Once the embryos are implanted in the womb, the pregnant
woman can still make autonomous decisions about her body, including
58. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928).
59. Renslow, 367 N.E.2d at 1264 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
60. Id.
61. Albala, 429 N.E.2d at 788.
62. See id. ("We determined long ago in a case involving policy issues as sensitive as the ones at bar that
foreseeability alone is not the hallmark of legal duty for if foreseeability were the sole test we could not
logically confine the extension of liability").
63. See Smolensky, supra note 37, at 325-28.
64. See id at 325.
65. Id. at 326.
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what substances to ingest, and whether to exercise."6 Importantly though,
bodily integrity has usually been understood as "reflect[ing] an interest to
be free from some forced intrusion to the body."" Professor Jaime King,
in her response to Professor Smolensky's article, sought to expand the
duty of care from intentional torts to include negligence as well." She
argued that "[i]ndividuals should owe a duty to their potential offspring to
act as reasonably prudent parents when making choices that do not conflict
with the mother's bodily integrity."
2. Problems with Generational Causation
Even if duty to the unconceived is established, plaintiffs in
preconception genetic torts still face the "sometimes insurmountable"
problem of showing causation when the tortious act occurred years or
decades (or in truly multigenerational claims, perhaps centuries) earlier."
But the inability or difficulty plaintiffs might face in showing legal
causation for their injuries should not be a total bar to their claims prior to
trial. Causation is difficult to show in many medical cases and is not
uniquely different in the realm of preconception torts. In Jorgensen, for
example, the court reasoned that causation in preconception torts should be
shown by "competent medical proof," similar to any other claim for
personal injury."
3. Legally Cognizable Injuries
After duty, the most problematic aspect of a preconception genetic
tort claim is determining just what harms are legally cognizable. It seems
clear that actual birth defects (such as Down Syndrome) are remediable.72
In the realm of toxic torts, courts have had difficulty in drafting a
manageable rule for when the increased risk of disease becomes judicially
actionable.
The debate over "wrongful life" as a cause of action is instructive. In
a wrongful life claim, a claim is brought on a disabled child's behalf
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See Jaime S. King, Symposium, Duty to the Unborn: A Response to Smolensky, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 377,
392 (2008).
69. See Greenberg, supra note 52, at 346.
70. See John B. Maynard, Note, Third-Generation-DES Claims, 27 NEW ENG. L. REV. 241, 265 (1992).
71. Jorgensen, 483 F.2d at 240.
72. See, e.g., id.
73. See generally David P. C. Ashton, Decreasing the Risks Inherent in Claims for Increased Risk of
Future Disease, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1081 (1989).
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alleging that the defendant failed to give the plaintiffs parents sufficient
information about the disability, and that the failure to do so lead to the
plaintiffs birth with the disability.74 Most jurisdictions have been
skeptical of the wrongful life cause of action." Professor Alan Belsky
proposes using strict products liability as a model for wrongful life cases,
where "damages would inure to the plaintiff not merely because the
provider's negligence caused an otherwise avoidable life, but because the
avoidable life will bring with it foreseeable suffering."76 Belsky is
opposed, however, to parental liability for wrongful life claims, arguing
that it would have a chilling effect on procreative liberty and is duplicative
of the pre-existing obligation that parents have to care for their children."
Likewise, the creation of a cause of action for failing to intervene
using advanced reproductive technologies has been criticized by
commentators.7 In contrast to this parental nonfeasance, there is support
among commentators and some courts to allow for liability under the
previously discussed parental misfeasance. Smolensky argues that "future
generations have not only a moral right, but also a legal right to an open
future, and limiting a child's future should be considered a legally
cognizable harm."" However, others argue that we should not constrain
ourselves to tort claims limiting an open future.o
PART IV: PARENTS SHOULD BE LIABLE IN TORT TO THEIR
CHILDREN FOR EPIGENETIC DISEASE
"Any current generation - through design or through negligence in
74. See Alan J. Belsky, Injury as a Matter of Law: Is this the Answer to the Wrongfid Life Dilemma?, 22
U. BALT. L. REV. 185, 189 (1993).
75. See generally id. at 189-205.
76. Id. at 248.
77. See id at 240-41.
78. See Smolensky, supra note 37, at 338. "Even absent such legislation, some constitutional concerns
might limit a parent's duty to a naturally conceived fetus carrying a gene for a disabling trait. For example,
concerns about maternal bodily integrity would likely prohibit parental liability in cases where parents
failed to abort or engage in prenatal genetic interventions. . . . Furthermore, even if one does not find the
constitutional concerns persuasive, recognizing an affirmative parental duty to engage in genetic
interventions might cause more harm than good. Such a duty may require all parents to undergo IVF and
PGS,214 or genetic screening and abortions, for fear that they might be found negligent for not exploring
the possibility that a genetic harm exists." Id. at 338-39.
79. Smolensky, supra note 37, at 312 (citing Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355, 360 (111. 1988);
Womack v. Buchhorn, 187 N.W.2d 218, 222 (Mich. 1971); Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (N.J.
1960)).
80. See King, supra note 68, at 383 n.38 ("The discussion by Buchanan and his coauthors, regarding the
child's right to an open future goes to the notion that parents should not close off their future children's
abilities through genetic choices in order to direct them into a certain life plan. This would not limit a tort
claim for physical harms that did not limit their right to an open future").
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permitting hazardous exposures - that alters the biological inheritance of
its successors has 'pre-ordained' the lives of future generations in
meaningful ways," writes Professor Mark Rothstein." "The current
generation will have weakened future generations, limited their options,
and required them to pay with their health or their lives for the
environmental misdeeds of their forebears."82 This Article proposes
parental liability for epigenetic diseases brought about by their
preconception misfeasance.
While there are myriad concerns associated with this form of
liability, the mere risk of problems with judicial manageability should not
preclude recovery for the actual harm suffered by a child." While some
have expressed concern over multigenerational liability,84 or proposed
arbitrary limitations on liability to a single generation," this Article does
not foresee the need for this bright-line rule. Epigenetic torts, even if they
implicate multiple generations, are not immune to the standard controls
used by courts to limit and restrict causes of action for negligence. The
problems with duty, to a lesser degree, and causation, to a greater degree,
inherent in proving a case of epigenetic harm serve as natural roadblocks
to unlimited liability. 86
What this proposal does is hold parents liable for the damage caused
to their epigenome by their negligent acts, even if those acts occur well
before conception occurs. As was discussed, a growing body of evidence
suggests that acts such as smoking can lead to heritable epigenetic
silencing leading to an increased risk for cancer in the actor's offspring."
Given the rapid progression of scientific discovery it seems only a matter
of time before we are able to show a causal link between an action like
smoking or heavy drinking and the later acquisition (or risk) of cancer in a
child due to the damage caused to the epigenome. Before going further it
should be noted that this proposal does not envision liability for either
epigenetic damage caused by involuntary exposure to chemicals (e.g.,
general air pollution or work-place exposures), nor does it intend to hold
8 1. Mark A. Rothstein, et al., The Ghost in Our Genes: Legal and Ethical Implications of Epigenetics, 19
HEALTH MATRIX 1, 58 (2009). Rothstein quotes C.S. Lewis's concern about "pre-ordain[ing]" future
generations due to genetic enhancement or eugenics, and argues that those same dangers apply to
epigenetic disease. See id. at 57-58.
82. Rothstein, supra note 81, at 58.
83. See Goldberg, supra note 57 and associated text.
84. See, Renslow, 367 N.E.2d at 1264 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
85. See, Enright, 570 N.E.2d at 203.
86. See supra, Part Ill1B.
87. See generally supra, Part I.
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parents liable for the genes that they were born with-even if those genes
result in disease or handicap.
The goal of tort law is to allocate costs in an efficient and rational
manner, allowing "actors [to] make a rational cost-benefit calculus
regarding whether the potential tort damages outweigh the expected
benefits derived from the wrongful conduct."" Not all harmful conduct
results in liability; "defendants avoid liability as long as their conduct is
reasonable in the view of the fact-finder."" The Renslow court's concerns
over unlimited liability are not unfounded, nor are the concerns of
Professors Smolensky and King. There is an understandable uneasiness
associated with holding a mother or father liable for the epigenetic damage
they caused thirty years prior to conception, when they were an avid
smoker or chronic drinker. But the very essence of tort law is to apportion
risk to the nearest actor able to prevent the harm from occurring90 and
actions to recover for preconception acts simply do not implicate the many
concerns over procreative liberty that are associated with wrongful life
claims.9 1
More importantly, concerns over bodily integrity are unlikely to be
seriously implicated in a tort scheme allowing this type of recovery.
Allowing an as-yet unconceived child to sue for the harm caused by his
mother or father's smoking habit is not fundamentally different from
allowing a child-or the state-to sue for harm caused by that child's
exposure to second-hand smoke in the household; in both situations,
parents are being asked to act reasonably to prevent harm to their child
without being asked to suffer a "forced intrusion to the body" implicating
a violation of bodily integrity.9 2 If anything, parents-even prior to
conception-are uniquely situated to prevent injury to their children
brought about from epigenetic damage; by allocating the risk of this
disease to the parent, we recognize that:
the starting point should be that granting an injured party a right
of action against the tortfeasor serves the interests of the former
more than the denial of such a right. It serves the interests of the
specific victim by compensating, at least in part, for the injury.
88. Elizabeth A. Weeks, Beyond Compensation: Using Torts to Promote Public Health, 10 J. HEALTH
CARE L. & POL'Y 27, 29-30.
89. Id. at 32.
90. Id.
91. See Belsky, supra note 74, at 241.
92. See Smolensky, supra note 37, at 326.
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And it serves the interests of all potential victims by deterring
potential injurers from future misconduct. Combining these two
considerations would have similar effects where the injured
party is a child and the tortfeasor is a parent. In fact, the child's
unique material and emotional dependence on a parent should
justify extending - not restricting - the parent's duty of care to
the child. The emotional effect of injury caused by a person
whose devotion is the cornerstone of the child's life is
immeasurably graver than that of equivalent injury that a
stranger causes."
This is essentially the same reasoning used by the Renslow court and
is particularly persuasive when examined in the context of the liability
being discussed here; deterring harmful behavior by potential parents
serves both individual and social welfare by reallocating risk from the
general public or the individual victim to the individual tortfeasor.
Given the ubiquity of having children, it seems unlikely that all
potentially tortious acts would have unforeseeable consequences-but this
theory of liability leaves intact the underlying requirements for proving a
negligence claim, among which are the requirement that the harm have
been foreseeable. Parental liability in this context merely recognizes that
in a world where scientific knowledge can show causal links between
certain actions and the subsequent risk of cancer in children, it is
implausible to reject these claims wholesale just because they involve
epigenetics. Parents ought not be immunized from liability based solely
on the unique relationship between mother and fetus, nor are they held
liable for every day actions that might "deprive[] a mother of her right to
control her life during pregnancy; rather, she is required to act with the
appropriate duty of care, as we have consistently held other persons are
required to act, with respect to the fetus." 9 4
Stripping away the argument for allocative efficiencies with regard to
risk, and distributing the economic burden to the tortfeasor, children
should be able to hold their parents liable for harms that restrict their
ability to have a future unburdened by debilitating illness or the
unnecessary risk of future disease." However, we do not want to strip all
parental autonomy or impose a burden on every member of society to limit
93. Ronen Perry, It's a Wonderfiul Life, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 329, 350 (2008).
94. See Bonte, 616 A.2d at 466.
95. See Smolensky, supra note 37, at 312 (Smolensky's argument for a cause of action reflecting the loss
of an "open future" is appropriate to the claims discussed in this article as well).
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every action they take. Traditional notions of reasonableness in tort
provide useful guidance, but what is reasonable in this context? Although
discussing parental liability for genetic intervention and not the
preconception harms at issue here, Professor Jennifer Rosato argues that a
standard of "significant risk of harm" is most appropriate.
Ultimately, the definition of harm in this context must strike a
delicate balance by protecting children while respecting the
parents' decision making authority. Existing abuse and neglect
laws reflect this balanced approach. Actual harm usually must
be shown, unless the parents possess a conflict of interest
[between parental autonomy and the child's potential
autonomy]. If a conflict exists, then a lesser showing is
permitted: state intervention is justified if the parental decision
would pose a significant risk of serious physical or emotional
harm.97
By shifting the timeframe for state intervention, it becomes plausible
to imagine the system proposed by this Article. State intervention, then, is
justified when the decisions of a prospective parent (or for that matter,
anyone who could have children) would pose a significant risk of serious
physical harm to their future offspring. Critics would certainly argue that
this could lead to draconian intervention and interference by the state,
which is why tort law provides a better alternative than state regulation in
preventing future harms.
Finally, some may question the appropriateness of shifting the
economic burden away from society for what could be described as
essentially innocent acts by this new breed of tortfeasor. But this assumes
that it is society's role to provide the economic backstop for this form of
harm solely because the act and the consequence are separated by several
decades. "Equality of fortune contends that in a just society the child's
misfortune is, in the first instance, its parents' obligation to correct.""
Professor Eric Rakowski provocatively suggests that the best solution to
the problem of group versus individual responsibility is to require parents
"to pay a fixed sum per child into an insurance pool that would be used to
96. Jennifer L. Rosato, The Children ofART (Assisted Reproductive Technology): Should the Law Protect
Them From Harm?, 2004 UTAH L. REv. 57, 109 (2004).
97. Id.
98. Eric Rakowski, Who Should Pay for Bad Genes?, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1345, 1389 (2002).
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compensate any children that were born genetically disadvantaged."99
This form of shared insurance is a reasonable alternative to the tort model
suggested by this Article; however, such a system fails to address the
underlying behavioral modification goals of tort that seek to lower, in this
case, society's overall costs associated with epigenetic disease.
PART V: CONCLUSION
The future of epigenetic research will likely yield a growing
understanding of how epigenetics affects disease and how this risk is
passed from generation to generation. The concerns implicated by this
Article are untested by courts largely because we are just now
understanding how acts during one's lifetime can impact children
conceived years later. It would be unreasonable to expect that as our
understanding progresses, aggrieved children would never seek to hold
their parents liable for the risks and illnesses needlessly suffered because
of the parents' tortious acts.
All of that is not to say that there are not significant hurdles in tort
law that could preclude some, most or even all claims for preconception
epigenetic torts. This is, however, more 'feature' than it is 'bug.' The
concerns expressed by commentators and courts over the potential for
limitless liability are now, and will continue to be, undermined by the
inherent difficulty in showing causation and foreseeability as the harm
becomes more attenuated from the tortious act. Allowing parental liability
would require individuals to bear more of the risk of their acts rather than
foisting that liability on society. Is the tort system the best method of
allocating risk and damages for these types of injuries? This Article
suggests that it is, but that some form of compulsory and universal
insurance system, such as the one proposed by Professor Rakowski, serves
as an alternative means of accomplishing the same goal. Insurance,
however, is plagued by the risk of moral hazard. Moreover, this insurance
system may be little more than six-of-one and half-a-dozen of another; in
both the status quo and the world of universal insurance it is society that
bears the risk to a greater or lesser degree. The advantage of parental
liability in tort is that the individual becomes responsible. While it is
unlikely that a great number of children will choose to sue their parents
under this theory of liability, there are few good reasons to simply reject
parental liability outright, and these children should have the chance to
99. Id. at 1398.
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present their case like any other claim for personal injury.

